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Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason, by 
William J. Wainwright. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1995. Pp. x,160. 
MARK R. TALBOT, Wheaton College 
Do our passions-our needs and interests, hopes and fears, wishes and 
willings, tastes and inclinations, feelings and attitudes-ever playa posi-
tive role in the epistemic justification of our beliefs? If they do, what 
role (or roles) do they properly play? More particularly, how might they 
contribute to the adequate assessment of the evidence for religious 
belief? 
Suspecting that many contemporary philosophers of religion under-
estimate the role that evidence can and should play in mature Christian 
belief, William Wainwright sets out to show how religious belief may be 
based on evidence, but on evidence that can only be properly appreciat-
ed by those possessing specific moral and spiritual qualities. 
Evidentialism claims our beliefs-or some proper subset of them-
"are rationally held if and only if one has sufficient evidence for them" 
(p. 2). Many Christians, including John Locke, have been evidentialists 
about religious belief, assuming not only that there is good evidence for 
it but also that the evidence will convince all fairminded inquirers.' Yet 
two interrelated facts have led many to deny evidentialism as applied to 
religious belief: first, none of the evidence for it seems compelling to all 
"fully informed, sufficiently intelligent, and adequately trained inquir-
er[s]" (p. 3); and, second, it "seems to depend more directly on the state 
of one's heart or moral temperament than on evidence" (ibid.). 
Here Wainwright proposes a middle way: perhaps God is not known 
either by 1II0bjective reason,' that is, by an understanding that systematical-
ly excludes passion, desire, and emotion" from the reasoning process (p. 3) 
or "only 'subjectively,' or by the heart" (ibid.), independently of any reason-
ing process. Perhaps proper religious belief results from processes that 
place" a high value on proofs, arguments, and inferences" even as they rec-
ognize "that a properly disposed heart is needed to see their force" (ibid.). 
This gives reason-as inference from evidence-an important although not 
unqualified place in the apprehension and defense of religious truth. 
Similar positions have appeared throughout philosophy's history. 
For instance, Aristotle claimed that our knowledge of the good life-our 
recognizing the right practical principles to be true-depends on our 
psychological health.2 Yet they have probably been most common in the 
Christian tradition; for, as Wainwright says, the claim that Christianity's 
evidence can only "be accurately assessed ... by men and women who 
possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications ... was once a 
Christian commonplace" (p. 3) held by thinkers as seemingly diverse as 
Calvin and Aquinas (see p. 4). 
This position was especially popular in the Reformed tradition of 
English and American Puritanism, and so it is especially appropriate 
that Wainwright's primary emphasis, in elucidating and evaluating it, is 
on the American Puritan, Jonathan Edwards. 
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At first glance, as Wainwright stresses, Edwards's position makes it 
seem that he held contradictory attitudes towards reason. For philo-
sophically Edwards was a foundationalist and an evidentialist who was 
undeniably attracted by the "almost uncritical confidence in reason's 
power and scope" (p. 7) that Continental Rationalists such as Nicholas 
Malebranche, Cambridge Platonists like Henry More and John Smith, 
the British Empiricist John Locke/ and the Newtonians all shared. This 
means that he often proceeded in the confidence that many truths about 
God could be philosophically established.4 Yet theologically Edwards 
was "a Calvinist who shared the Reformed tradition's distrust of 
humanity's natural capacities and its skepticism about natural theology" 
(ibid.). And so he could claim that, without divine assistance, even "'the 
best reasoner in the world ... might be led into the grossest errors and 
contradictions'" about God and His world (p. 8). 
The appearance of contradiction disappears, however, when 
Edwards's position is fully elucidated. His Calvinism led him to insist 
that reason, like all our other natural powers and capacities, has been 
damaged by sin. Yet it did not require him to say that natural theolo-
gy-where reason seeks to "prove God's existence, determine the nature 
of many of His attributes, discern our obligations to Him, and establish 
the credibility of scripture" (p. 9)-was thereby made impossible. 
Uninstructed human reason, Edwards thought, is likely to go very far 
astray, but even sin-damaged natural reason can demonstrate some of 
natural theology's claims to be true, provided it does not have to discover 
them. And Scripture reveals many of these claims to us. Moreover, nat-
ural reason can know that the Scriptures are God's revelation. So 
"'[d]ivine testimony'" can become "a rule of reason, a kind of evidence, 
and a type of argument like the 'human testimony of credible eye-wit-
nesses,' 'credible history,' 'memory,' 'present experience,' 'geometrical 
mensuration,' 'arithmetical calculation,' and 'strict metaphysical distinc-
tion and comparison'" (p. 15; the internal quotations here and elsewhere 
are from Edwards).5 Scripture can then be used to establish other 
truths-e.g., that there is a difference in kind and not merely in degree 
between those human beings who are spiritually regenerate and those 
who remain naturally unregenerate6-that are far beyond uninstructed 
reason's ken. 
So reason, according to Edwards, even reason unassisted by grace, 
can-and, in fact, occasionally does-achieve '''a kind of assent ... to the 
truths of the Christian religion, from the rational proofs or arguments 
that are offered to evince it'" (p. 17). Indeed, we should expect natural 
reason to have this ability, if Christianity correctly claims that God will 
someday justly reward or punish each of us for our belief or disbelieF 
Yet natural reason seldom achieves such assent. Why is this? 
Edwards's answer is that we do not believe rightly because we do not 
inquire rightly; and we do not inquire rightly because we lack '''a dispo-
sition to improve' the 'light' God has given us" (p. 17). 
This "depraved disposition," Edwards argued, is "natural to all 
mankind" (OS, p. 148); it is only remedied supernaturally, by infusions 
of common or special grace." Edwards's most interesting epistemologi-
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cal claims concern the epistemic changes that follow on the infusion of 
special grace. Wainwright examines two of the ways that Edwards 
claims our grasp of religious truths is affected by such grace. 
Most fundamentally, it changes our hearts. 9 Edwards, like most 
Reformed theologians, thought that while all human beings can attain to 
'" a kind of assent ... to the truths of the Christian religion, from the 
rational proofs or arguments that are offered to evince it'," a saving 
knowledge of God's work in Christ cannot be arrived at without God's 
special aid. For a saving knowledge of God's work in Christ requires 
the Holy Spirit so to indwell and regenerate the hearts of his elect that 
He becomes, for them, "a principle or spring of new nature and life" 
(RA, p. 200). It is His life in them that brings spiritual light and know 1-
edge-spiritual light and knowledge so different from anything that the 
unregenerate can experience that "conversion is often compared to 
opening the eyes of the blind" (RA, p. 204). And from this it follows, 
Edwards concludes, "that in those gracious exercises and affections 
which are wrought in the minds of the saints, through the saving influ-
ences of the Spirit of God, there is a new inward perception or sensation of 
their minds, entirely different in its nature and kind, from anything that ever 
their minds were the subjects of before they were sanctified" (RA, p. 205; my 
emphasis). This involves God laying "a new foundation ... in the 
nature of the soul" for an entirely "new kind of exercises of the ... facul-
ty of understanding" that enables the saved to apprehend for the first 
time the true spiritual beauty of God and His works (RA, p. 206; d. 
Wainwright, p. 2Sf.). And the saved apprehend this because God pro-
duces "a new simple idea" (RA, p. 205) in their minds-the idea of "the 
beauty of holiness" (RA, p. 260).10 
Wainwright spends over ten pages examining these claims about a 
new simple idea and a new supernatural sense to see if they make any 
clear sense. He then explores how the heart's experience of true spiritu-
al beauty can result in reason's grasping various religious truths. For 
Edwards, "true virtue"-or "benevolence to Being in general"-is the 
mechanism underlying the new spiritual sense. ll So if, as Wainwright 
observes, "we can show that benevolence has a foundation in the nature 
of things, we can conclude that the spiritual sense, too, is aligned with 
reality" (p. 34). Edwards's best attempts to show that benevolence has 
such a foundation presuppose theistic metaphysics; and so Wainwright 
spends a couple of pages showing why this does not involve him in cir-
cularity. As Wainwright says, Edwards's account of this sense of the 
heart" goes some way toward filling an important gap in contemporary 
discussions-the failure adequately to explain how theistic belief-pro-
ducing mechanisms operate" (p. 40), which is important both for judg-
ing the reliability of such mechanisms and for having any hope of judg-
ing which of several such mechanisms is most likely to be the one that 
produces true beliefs. 
The second way that special grace may affect our grasp of religious 
truths is that it can sanctify reason, where reason, taken as our power to 
grasp truth, is contrasted with the heart, as that which grasps beauty or 
excellency. It does this both by removing prejudices Uland so lay[ing] 
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the mind more open to the force of arguments'" and by positively 
enlightening and assisting us to see the force of rational arguments by 
'''adding greater light, clearness and strength to the judgment'" (p. 43). 
These claims become philosophically interesting when Wainwright 
details them; but space prohibits me from spelling them out. 
Since Wainwright's larger project is not only to put Edwards's position 
back on the table but also to convince us that it is more difficult to refute 
than we may have previously thought, he then devotes a chapter apiece to 
the somewhat similar views of John Henry Newman and William James. 
Newman, he thinks, demonstrates that "the properties Edwards finds in 
religious reasoning are features of all [informal] reasoning," while James 
shows in some detail how "[iJnquiry in the humanities and social sciences, 
in everyday life, and even in science unavoidably reflects ... our 'willing' 
or 'passional' nature-our temperament, needs, concerns, fears, hopes, 
passions, and 'divinations'" (p. 5). James's account, unlike Edwards's and 
Newman's, has the added advantage of making its points without presup-
posing theistic metaphysics. 
Wainwright's second-to-the-last chapter confronts two interrelated 
objections: first, that positions like these are epistemically and morally 
objectionable precisely because they allow the passions a place in the 
reasoning process-which Wainwright argues begs the question "by 
implicitly assuming theism is false or that subjective qualifications are 
not needed to know God" (p. 115)-and, secondly, that this defense of 
these positions is vitiated by circularity-to which Wainwright replies 
that, while "theists do rely on their own assessments of the evidence's 
force, and this commits them to thinking that they are in a superior epis-
temic position with respect to its evaluation[,] ... any reliance on one's 
own assessments in matters of basic dispute involves similar assump-
tions" (p. 116). There is, then, no "non-question-begging way of mutual-
ly resolving basic disagreements" for either side in these epistemological 
discussions (p. 123). Recognizing this, however, raises "the specter of 
relativism" (p. 124); and so Wainwright devotes a final chapter to dis-
cussing what fundamental disagreements over basic standards of ratio-
nality imply. His conclusion is that views like these can actually help to 
defuse relativism by explaining why such fundamental disagree-ments 
exist and persist. An "Epilogue" gives us more reasons to take such 
views seriously. 
Anyone who is familiar with Wainwright's writings knows that much 
of the strength of his work lies in his careful, analytical elucidation of 
what various claims may mean and in his meticulous assessments of the 
strengths and weaknesses of various arguments. I have resisted engag-
ing him on that level for fear that his more general claims would thereby 
be obscured. Indeed, my one serious reservation about this book is that 
Wainwright's painstaking attention to some of the details of Edwards's, 
Newman's, and James's historical positions tends to make it hard for a 
reader to see the forest for the trees. Yet ultimately it is his attention to 
those details that guards the general position from being rejected out of 
hand. This book does succeed "in placing a neglected view back on the 
table" in a way that ought to convince its readers "that positions such as 
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Edwards's"-who was consciously committed to defending the theolo-
gy of historic Reformational Protestantism-"are more difficult to refute 
than they previously may have thought" (p. 6). 
NOTES 
1. On Locke's opinions see, especially, Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke 
and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
2. See p. 149ff. See, as well, Plato, Republic, 401d-402a, which 
Wainwright does not cite. As Wainwright does make clear, Plato thought 
that our hearts' states affect more than our grasp of practical principles; they 
affect how we think about metaphysical issues as well. Kant thought the 
same thing. 
3. From whose pages, Edwards said, he had received more pleasure 
"than the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and 
gold." 
4. So, e.g., it is not uncharacteristic for Edwards to begin his Dissertation 
concerning the end for which God created the world with a chapter entitled 
"What Reason Teaches Concerning This Affair." 
5. So the second and final chapter of Edwards's Dissertation concerning 
the end for which God created the world is entitled "What Is to Be Learned from 
Holy Scriptures Concerning God's Last End in the Creation of the World." 
6. See especially Religious Affections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959), Part III, First Sign (especially pp. 197-210). Hereafter cited intratextu-
ally as "RA". 
7. Edwards's acceptance of this conditional is perhaps clearest in Part 1, 
Chapter I, Section 6 of Original Sin (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1970; hereafter cited intratextually as "OS"), which is enti-
tled, "The corruption of man's nature appears by its tendency, in its present 
state, to an extreme degree of folly and stupidity in matters of religion". Ed-
wards assumes a Calvinist view on nonbelief here, which sees nonbelief as 
always being the consequence of culpable actions or omissions on the non-
believer's part. (E.g., "if ... every age, and every nation, and every man, 
[has] sufficient light afforded, to know God, and to know and do their 
whole duty to him; then their inability to deliver themselves must be a 
moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity, and most evil disposi-
tion of heart" [aS, p. 151].). 
Several of us have argued similarly since. See, e.g., the final section of my 
"Starting from Scripture," in Robert C. Roberts and Mark R. Talbot, eds., 
Limning the Psyche: Explorations in Christian Psychology (Grand Rapids and 
Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), and the articles 
by George Schlesinger, David Basinger, and myself cited there. In Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1993), J.L. Schellenberg claims that my 1989 Faith and Philosophy piece, "Is It 
Natural to Believe in God?," "is the only piece of writing in the contempo-
rary literature of philosophy of religion devoted in its entirety to defending 
the Calvinist view of nonbelief" and then spends eight pages attacking it. 
Actually, my primary purpose in that article was more to articulate Calvin's 
position than to defend it-and so my defense was deliberately short and 
incomplete. Schellenberg would claim that Edwards's (and Wainwright's) 
similar epistemological claims would fall prey to similar objections, 
although Wainwright's book goes a long ways towards answering them. 
8. In Reformed thought, common grace is available to everyone; 
regarding reason, it "helps the faculties 'to do that more fully which they do 
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by nature,' strengthening 'the natural principles [e.g., conscience] against 
those things that tend to stupify [sic] it and to hinder its free exercise'" (p. 
42; the bracketed interpolations are Wainwright's). Special grace is extend-
ed only to God's elect and it is by its infusion that they become regenerate, 
with all that that entails, epistemically and otherwise. 
9. For more on this, see the last section of my "Starting from Scripture," 
op. cit. As I say there, in Scripture the heart stands for the center of our per-
sonalities, the seat and source of all our powers-rational, volitional, emo-
tional, and spiritual-and as such it ultimately determines what we believe, 
feel, do, and say. Consequently, throughout Scripture its change is singled 
out as the central and decisive factor in saving belief. 
10. So the full picture, according to Edwards, is this: 
there is given to those that are regenerated, a new supernatural sense, 
that is as it were a certain divine spiritual taste, which is in its whole 
nature diverse from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tast-
ing is diverse from any of the other five senses, and ... something is 
perceived by a true saint in the exercise of this new sense of mind, in 
spiritual and divine things, as entirely different from anything that is 
perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is 
diverse from the ideas men get of honey by looking on it or feeling of 
it [RA, 259f.]. 
11. Jonathan Edwards, Ethical Writings (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1989), p. 540. This is found in the second of Edwards's 
Two Dissertations, entitled, The Nature of True Virtue. The first dissertation is 
the previously cited Dissertation concerning the end for which Cod created the 
world. In the sentence after the one quoted in the text, Edwards says that 
true virtue, "perhaps to speak more accurately, ... is that consent, propensi-
ty and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a 
general good will." 
Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Beliefby Jerome I. 
Gellman. Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x and 211. $32.50 (cloth) 
JOHN ZEIS, Canisius College 
As the author states in the Preface, "This book was written from the con-
viction that in an impressive number of instances God has been and con-
tinues to be known in experience"(p. ix). Gellman's book is an articula-
tion of an argument that on the basis of the apparent experiences of God, 
it is rational to believe that God exists. A convenient way to view 
Gellman's project is as an attempt at a synthesis and strengthening of 
the arguments from religious experience found in the works of Richard 
Swinburne in The Existence of God and William Alston in Perceiving God. 
Like Swinburne, he relies heavily upon a version of the Principle of 
Credulity. Unlike Swinburne, and like Alston, Gellman argues that 
apparent perceptions of God are sufficient on their own to show the 
rationality of belief in God. Gellman thinks that he provides a successful 
argument for a strong rationality thesis which leads him, unlike Alston, 
